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THE "I'M ALONE" CASE AND THE DOCTRINE
OF "HOT PURSUIT"
KEENm C. FRAzit*
On March 22nd, a United States coast guard vessel sunk the
Canadian rum schooner, I'm Alone. The destruction of the ship
was accomplished upon the.high seas and at a very considerable dis-
tance from American territorial waters.
The incident soon became a popular subject of press comment.
The two governments concerned exchanged diplomatic notes dis-
cussing the facts and the legal problems involved. A review of these
communications is here in point.'
At the request of the Canadian Government, the Secretary of
State of the United States on March 28th, stated the facts in the
case.2 The I'm Alone appears to have been a well known offender,
having been engaged in smuggling liquor into the United States for
years. In 1928 the vessel changed its base of operations from the
New England coast to British Honduras. On March 20th, 1929, it
was sighted by the United States coast guard vessel Walcott, within
ten and one-half miles of the coast of the United States. Upon the ap-
proach of the Walcott the I'm Alone fled. The Walcott ordered the
schooner to halt for boarding, but this command was not complied
with. The Walcott pursued the I'm Alone seaward, calling on her to
halt. This command was not obeyed, and the Walcott fired warning
shots, first across the bow of the schooner and then into the sails and
riggings. At this juncture the Walcott's gun jammed and she sum-
moned to her assistance the coast guard vessel Dexter, which joined
in the pursuit. The Dexter warned the I'm Alone to stop, but the
master of the schooner refused to heed. After firing warning
shots the Dexter put several shots into the hull of the I'm Alone,
whereupon she sank. The crew were rescued -by the coast guard
vessels, with the exception of one seaman who was drowned. It
was stated that the vessel could not have been boarded because of
the roughness of the sea, and furthermore the master of the I'm
Alone indicated that he would forcibly resist such an effort. The
* Assistant Professor of Government, University of North Carolina.
See recent discussion by W. C. Dennis, 23 Am. Jr. Int. Law 351 (1929).
2 MS. Department of State, Press release, April 26, 1929.
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officers and crew of the schooner were placed under arrest and taken
to New Orleans for trial.3
The Canadian minister in replying to the American note pointed
out the difference in the statement of facts made by the coast guard
officers and the master of the I'm Alone.4 He further declared that
the proceedings of the coast guard were without legal foundation.,
It was admitted that the I'm Alone had "unquestionably been
engaged for a number of years, under various owners, in endeavor-
ing to smuggle liquor into the United States." But in the instant
case the master of the I'm Alone claimed to be, when challenged, not
less than fourteen and one-half miles from the American coast. It
was also pointed out that during the chase of the schooner by the
Walcott the cutter Dexter came up from another direction.
Referring to the legal question involved, the Canadian Govern-
ment pointed out that the Treaty of 19245 between the United
States and Great Britain, and to which Canada agreed, was concluded
"because the parties were desirous of avoiding any difficulties which.
might arise" in connection with the subject. It was stated in the
treaty that while the parties reaffirmed their intention to uphold
the three mile limit principle, the British Government would make
no objection to visit and search beyond the three mile limit "when
appearances warranted." The rights so conferred were not to be exer-
cised at a greater distance from the United States coast than could be
traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of endeavoring to
commit the offense, or by any other vessel in which the liquor was
intended to be conveyed to shore.
"It was of the essence of the Convention that its provisions
covered the whole field of extra-territorial seizures." It appeared
to be established that the vessel was at all times beyond the limit of
an hour's sailing distance from the shore.
The Canadian Government questioned the appropriate applica-
tion of the doctrine of "hot pursuit." It was admitted that the validity
of the doctrine is recognized in international law and by Canadian
courts, if the pursuit is begun within the three mile limit. The state-
ment of Secretary Hughes, January 23, 1924,6 is here quoted to sus-
tain this point. He stated that the United States Government did not
* Criminal proceedings against the master and crew of the I'm Alone have
been dropped at the request of the United States government. U. S. Daily,
April 10, 1929.
'MS. Department of State, Press release, April 26, 1929.
" U. S. Treaty Series, No. 685.
'Foreign Affairs, Special Supplement to Vol. II, No. 2, pp. iv and v.
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claim territorial limits in excess of three miles. However, extra-terri-
torial seizures might be made in the case of "hot pursuit" where the
vessel has committed an offense against those laws, and is caught
while trying to escape.
The fact that the sinking of the I'm Alone was not done by the
cutter that commenced the pursuit but by one which "came up from
a different direction two days later," is suggested as an additional.
ground for objection to the application of this doctrine.
Finally objection is made to the destruction of the I'm Alone by
the coast guard vessel, as unwarranted by the circumstances and un-
authorized -by the treaty.
The Canadian note finally sums up the points at issue and the
position of the government of Canada.
"1. The search and seizure of vessels beyond territorial waters
should be exercised in accordance with the terms of the Convention.
"2 . .. that pursuit should not be continued beyond an hour's
sailing distance from the shore unless initiated within territorial
waters. (Three mile limit).
"3. . . . that the measures adopted for enforcing the rights
conferred by the Convention should be confined to the reasonable
minimum necessary for their enforcement, and that in the present
instance the extreme course adopted constitutes just ground for such
redress as is now possible."
The American Secretary of State replied to the Canadian minister
on April 17th,7 expressing complete agreement as to the propriety
of the representations of the Canadian Government in such cases,
in the interest of the maintenance of the principles of international
law. He referred to the points of difference suggested in the Cana-
dian protest. The United States based its claim to jurisdiction over
the I'm Alone when first challenged upon evidence collected by a
special representative of the Department of Justice of the United
States, upon the statements of the commanders of the coast guard
vessels involved, and finally upon the sworn affidavit of an impartial
observer. All of which proved that the I'm Alone was not at a greater
distance than ten and eight-tenths of a mile from the shore when
first challenged. "If he (the Captain of the I'm Alone) believed
that his vessel was -beyond one hour's saiiing distance from the shore.
when first hailed, he must have known that his vessel could not be
legally seized by the coast guard vessel and that he had nothing
'MS. Department of State, Press release, April 26, 1929.
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whatever to fear in complying with the command to stop and be
examined."
3
In respect to the speed of the I'm Alone, it is well established
that she was fully capable of attaining a greater speed than ten and
eight-tenths miles an hour, and hence would come squarely within
the treaty limits.
As to the Canadian objections that the doctrine of hot pursuit
could not apply since "(a) the chase began not from territorial
waters (i.e. the three mile limit) but from the treaty distance of an
hour's sailing; (b) the arrest of the vessel was performed not by the
original pursuing vessel, but by another which had been called for
assistance," it was replied that (a) pursuit beginning within the
treaty limit is legal. This position has been taken by Parker, J., in
the Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of the Vinces.9 If arrest
is valid when the vessel is first hailed, pursuit is justified, and "the
locus of the arrest and the distance of the pursuit are immaterial,
provided: (1) that it is without the territorial waters of any other
state; (2) that the pursuit has been hot and continuous." The
duration of the pursuit is unimportant, if the foregoing principles are
adhered to.
With regard to the joining in the pursuit by a second coast guard
vessel, it was submitted in the note that there was a distinct unity
and connection between the pursuing ships.
Finally as to the sinking of the I'm Alone, it was contended that
because of the refusal of the captain to submit and the impossibility
of boarding, drastic measures were justified. The laws of Canada
permit such action.10 The loss of the life of the seaman was a
misfortune which the captain of the I'm Alone might have pre-
vented by surrender.
On April 24th, the Canadian Government, through its minister,
replied to the foregoing." Commenting upon the position of the
American Government, it was suggested that the question under dis-
cussion appeared capable of settlement only by an impartial tribunal.
"This statement is of particular interest because it indicates a reliance
by the American Government upon the one hour's ruling as established by the
treaty with Great Britain in 1924. The United States Tariff Act of 1922 estab-
lishing the twelve mile limit for purposes of revenue control is nowhere referred
to in the note, and would receive no International Law recognition.
*The Vinces, 20 F. (2d) 164, 174-5 (E.D. S. C. 1927) ; affirmed as Gillam
v. U. S., 27 F. (2d) 296, 299 (C. C. A. 4th 1928).
Canada, Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §7 (2).
'MS. Department of State, Press release, April 26, 1929.
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Referring to the applicability of the doctrine of hot pursuit, it
was maintained that within the limits of its strictest interpretation,
it has not been universally accepted, and in respect to its extension,
as interpreted -by the United States, it is without basis. The decisions
of the courts of the United States do not have international validity,
nor have they been accepted by the government of Canada. In the
case of the Vinces, mentioned in the American note, the British
Ambassador had stated that his government did not accept the prin-
ciples upon which the decision of the District Court had been based.
The treaty with Great Britain expressly confirms the agreement in
the recognition of the three mile territorial limit; hence the right to
pursue from a point beyond that limit is not implied.
Finally, it was repeated, that the right to seize could not be
regarded as justifying the sinking of the Fm Alone, for, "when all
of the circumstances are taken into account . . . the impression
that is formed is of a distinctly punitive intent." The result could
only be justified upon the assumption that the ship was within treaty
limits when challenged and that pursuit 'would be justified. The pro-
posal, on the part of the American Government to arbitrate the matter,
as provided for in the treaty, would be accepted -by the Canadian
Government.
Upon the request of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General
of the United States expressed an opinion upon the controverted
points.12 His conclusions were: that the I'm Alone was a notorious
rum runner found in close proximity to the coast of the United States
and therefore gave cause for the belief that she was attempting a
breach of law, and was hence subject to being boarded and seized
under the terms of the treaty. That the pursuit having begun within
an hour's sailing distance of the shore, was permitted under the terms
of the treaty, and that the doctrine of "hot pursuit" applies. Upon
this point the Attorney-General referred to the decision in the case
of the United States v. Gillam.1 3 The fact that another vessel
joined in the pursuit does not prevent the application of the doc-
trine "so long as a vessel of the United States was continually in
sight of the I'm Alone." Upon the final point the opinion was that
in view of the felonious nature of the offense of which the I'm
Alone was guilty, the coast guard vessels were warranted in sinking
her if she could not be taken by other means.
"MS. Department of State, Press release, April 26, 1929.
"27 F. (2d) 296 (C. C. A. 4th 1928).
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The questions which have been raised in connection with the I'm
Alone case justify a review of the current international practice
and the claims of the states concerned. As to the general problem,
there is certainly nothing novel in the claim of the littoral state to
jurisdiction and control over the marginal sea.14 However, it is
generally agreed that such claims may not operate so as to interfere
with the right of foreign vessels to pass freely upon the high seas
in time of peace.
While it has been assumed since the medieval period, that only a
narrow margin of the sea may -be under the jurisdiction of a state,
there has been no general agreement as to the limits of this area. 15
However, it is generally believed that the three mile limit stands as a
rule of international customary law.16 Exceptions to this rule may be
observed for "a state may endeavor to prevent, in times of peace
or war, the commission of certain acts by foreign ships, or the occu-
pants thereof, at a distance of more than three marine miles from its
coast, without claiming that the place where they occur is a part
of its domain."' 7 It is to be observed that authority within the three
mile territorial belt is jurisdictional, whereas authority exercised
beyond that limit is properly regarded as administrative control.1 8
The municipal laws of states contain variationsisa with respect to
claims of jurisdiction and control over the adjacent sea. In the year
1736 the English Parliament enacted a law whereby "hovering"
within four leagues, or twelve miles, of the coast of England was
forbidden.' 9 However, as early as 1805 Lord Stowell in the case
of the Anna, spoke of the marine boundary as "being about three
miles from the shore."' 20 The British Government definitely claimed
the three mile territorial limit in the enactment in 1878 of the Terri-
torial Waters Jurisdiction Act.21 In 1893, Sir Charles Russell,
Crown Advocate, in speaking before an international tribunal, ex-
"'Bynkershoek as early as 1737 expressed concretely the idea that the sea
admits of appropriation to the limits of common range or effective control.
QusTIONEs JuRis PUBLICi, Lib. I, ch. 8.
"Dickinson, rurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(1926).
1 JESsUP, THE LAW OF TEmmToRaL WATERS AND MARITIME JuRISDiCrioN
(192M); MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS (1928).
1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED By
rH. UNITEo STATES, Vol. I, p. 257.
" JEssup, supra note 16, Introduction, p. xxxii.
23 Am. Jr. Int. Law 249. Special Supplement.
Geo. II, cxviii.
'The Anna, 5 C. Rob. 373, 385c.
' 41 and 42 Victoria, ch. 73, §7
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pressed the opinion that "hovering laws for the prevention of smug-
gling rested on the principle that no civilized state will encourage
offenses against the laws of another state, the justice of which law it
recognizes. It willingly allows a foreign state to take reasonable
measures of 'prevention within a moderate distance even outside
territorial waters."1
22
In the United States the weight of opinion among statesmen and
as expressed in Congress and in court decisions upholds the exten-
sion of the authority of the state beyond the three mile limit. Thomas
Jefferson, writing in 1793 to M. Genet, stated that the smallest dis-
tance claimed "is the utmost range of a cannon ball, usually stated
at one league," or three miles.
2 3
In 1799 the Congress of the United States authorized the exercise
of certain acts of customs control within a twelve mile zone.2 4 The
Supreme Court of the United States did not denounce the act as being
at variance with International Law.
The case of Church v. Hubbart decided in 1804 is the leading
American case on the jurisdiction of the nation over the sea adjoining
it. In this instance Chief Justice Marshall declared that "a nation's
power to secure itself from injury might certainly be exercised in the
marginal sea -beyond the limits of territorial waters. '2 5 The exercise
of extra-territorial authority is necessary to insure territorial security.
Recent cases have been decided upon the authority of the statute of
1799, and in accordance with the view expressed by Marshall.
In 1922 the Congress of the United States enacted into law a
Tariff Act establishing the authority of the United States for certain
revenue purposes for a distance of twelve miles measured from the
coast seaward.2 6 The courts of the United States have generally up-
held the validity of the Act of 1922, as they had the Act of 1799,
although distinguishing between the territorial jurisdiction within
the three mile limit and the right to make extra-territorial seizures
within twelve miles of the shore.
27
'Fur Seal Arbitration Proceedings, Vol. XIII, 1076-79.
MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. I, p. 7.
'Act of Congress, Mar. 2, 1799; Rev. Stat., §99; U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918)
§2760.
"Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 234 (1804).
U. S. Code, Title Customs Duties, §481.
"The Henry L. Marshall, 286 Fed. 260 (S. D. N. Y. 1922) ; The Marjorie
E. Bachman, 4 F. (2d) 405 (D. C. Mass. 1925) ; U. S. v. Bengochea, 279 Fed.
537 (C. C. A. 5th. 1922) ; The Grace and Ruby, 283 Fed. 475 (D. C. Mass.
1922).
Claims to extra-territorial control such as those asserted by the United
States are advanced by other nations. The civil codes of Argentina, Chile and
Ecuador contain such provisions. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters, p. 9.
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The treaty of 1924, agreed to by the United States and Great
Britain, adopted a one-hour cruising distance from the coast as the
limit of extra-territorial control to be exercised by the United States.
An interesting question now arises. Does the treaty of 1924 serve
to negative the statute of 1922? The courts of the United States
have held in some cases that it does not; in others the affirmative
view has been taken.28 In a diplomatic note explaining the position
of the American Government, in the I'm Alone case, the American
Secretary of State implies that it does.29 Certainly it cannot be sup-
posed that the decisions of the municipal courts of the United States,
unsupported by international practice, would meet with acceptance on
the part of other nations. This implication, on the part of the United
States Department of State, in relying solely on the provisions of the
treaty, appears very significant, in view of the "test case" aspect of
the present controversy.
The governments concerned differ as to the application of the "hot
pursuit" doctrine to the situation of the I'm Alone. Both parties
agree in recognizing the existence of the principle. The statement
of Sir Charles Russell is sometimes interpreted as expressing the
attitude of Great Britain. ". . . it must be hot pursuit, it must be
immediate, and it must be within limits of moderation. ... In
other words we are still considering the character of the act which
is not defined -by international law, but which is something which a
nation will stand by and see done, and not interpose, if they think
that the particular person has been endeavoring to commit a fraud
against the laws of a friendly power."8 0 The great advocate further
says that the doctrine rests upon acquiescence. It should be noted
that today "hot pursuit" is regarded as "a perfect right under inter-
national customary law." The doctrine wais applied by a Canadian
court in the case of an American vessel committing a breach of the
fishing laws. She was pursued from within three miles of the shore
and seized one and three quarter miles beyond the three mile limit.
The Supreme Court of Canada in reviewing the case said that it was
"bound to take notice of the law of nations and . . . by that law
when a vessel within foreign territory commits an irlfraction of its
" Gillam v. U. S., 27 F. (2d) 296 (G. C. A. 4th 1928) ; The Squanto, 13 F.
(2d) 382 (C. C. A. 2d 1926) ; The Mistinguette, 14 F. (2d) 753 (S. D. N. Y.
1926); The Pesaquid, 11 F. (2d) 308 (D. C. R. I. 1926); Ford v. U. S., 273
U. S. 593, 609 (1926) ; U. S. v. Farris, 19 F. (2d) 925 (N. D. Calif, 1927).
'MS. Department of State, Press Release, April 26, 1929.
' Fur Seal Arbitration Proceedings, Vol. XIII, p. 300 (p. 1079 of original
report).
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laws either for tile protection of its fisheries, or its revenues, or its
coasts, she may be immediately pursued into the open seas beyond
the territorial limits, and there taken.8 '
American courts have supported the right to pursue vessels be-
yond the three mile limit if they 'have been guilty of a violation of
law within that area. It should be noted that in the case of the
Itata82 a vessel guilty of violating our neutrality laws was pursued
by an American warship from the territorial waters of the United
States, into the territorial wafers of Chile. The pursuit was held to
be valid until continued in Chilean territory. In the recent case of
the Vinces the court decided that pursuit initiated beyond the three
mile limit but within the one hour limit. is permitted under the terms
of the treaty with Great Britain. The language of the court is posi-
tive. ". . if the right of seizure existed at the time the vessel was
signaled, the right was not lost because she had succeeded in getting
farther from shore in her attempt to run away."3 3 The situation of
the I'm Alone was similar to that of the Vinces. According to the
contention of the United States Government, she was within one
hour's sailing distance of the shore, and therefore she could be legiti-
mately taken when pursued into the open sea. The preamble of the
treaty pledges the contracting parties to maintain the three mile
territorial limit. Article III provides that the rights conferred (search
and seizure) by the treaty shall not be exercised at a greater distance
from the shore than can be traversed in one hour's time by the vessel
suspected. According to the preamble, the three mile limit is to be
maintained as the territorial limit, although under Article III extra-
territorial seizures may be made within the one hour limit. There
is no specific provision in the treaty that permits the seizure of the
ships upon the high seas, when pursuit is begun beyond the three
mile limit and within the one hour limit. Nor can such procedure
.be justified by the practice of other nations. Authoritative writers
agree that pursuit must begin within "territorial waters," which in
the present instance is definitely established as three miles from
the shore.3 4
"The North, 37 Can. Sup. Ct. Rep. (1906).
"Mooz, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, II, 985-986.
Gillam v. U. S., 27 F. (2d) 296 (C. C. A. 4th 1928).5
HALL, INTBRNATioNAL LAW (4th ed.) p. 267; (8th ed.) p. 309; HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIMrLY AS INTEDPaMTED AND APPLIED BY THE U. S.,
Vol. I, pp. 418-21.
It can scarcely be thought that the joining in the pursuit by a second
United States coast guard vessel materially alters the fact that the pursuit was
immediate and continuous.
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Can the sinking of the I'm Alone be justified? In the absence
of a provision in the treaty covering such contingencies, the rule
of international law governing visit and search, in time of peace,
may be held to apply. Oppenheim states that if the command to halt
is not heeded, "force may be resorted to."
3 5
At the suggestion of the American Government, the I'm Alone
case is to be referred for settlement to an international tribunal, as
provided for in Article IV of the treaty. Any British vessel which
claims an injury through the improper exercise of the rights con-
ferred by the treaty upon the United States shall have its petition for
redress referred to a commission of two persons "one of whom shall
be nominated by each of the High contracting parties." If these two
persons fail to agree, the matter is to be referred to the claims com-
mission, established under the Pecuniary Claims Convention of
August 18, 1910. It is presumed that this commission may be con-
vened at any time for the hearing of such causes as those arising out
of the I'm Alone incident.3 6
• OPPENHErm, Vol. I, (2nd ed., 1912) §268, p. 337.
U MiLoy's TREAvEs, III, p. 2619.
